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IN THE SUPRE.ME COURT
of the
STATE OF UTAH
KENN~CO'l"I'

COPPIDR

CORPO-

RA'l'ION, and
BINGHAM AND GAHFH~LD
H.AILWAY CCnlPANY,
r> 1('1·J·1 I .;ft.~

_.1.

.''.

<

[1

••

'

-vs.THJi~ STA'J'Ji~

Case No.
7298

TAX CO:\l ;\li8H10N,
Defr.ndanf.

Plaintiffs respt>dfnlly rPquest a
above cause on the following grounds:

n~!Jearing-

of the

1. This Court's conclusion that depletion may be
computed only on that part of Kennecott's net income
from the property allocated to Utah can find support in
neither fac't nor law and contravenes the express mandate of the legislature to the contrary by Chapter 13,
Title 80, Utah Code Annotated 1943, especially its Sections 80-13-8 (9) (b) and 80-13-21.
1

2. This Court has violated basic and elementary
principles of statutory construction by concluding that
depletion may be computed only on that part of Kennecott's net income from the property a:;:signed to Utah.

:1. The Court erred in its decision relative to the
depletion deduction 'Wherein it held that Kennecott's
request to change ,the method of computation was "unduly delayed," a hoMing contrary to fact and not raised
by the Commission.
4. The Court erred m holding that Kennecott's
request for permission to change the method of depletion
eomputation was for no" substantial" n~ason, but merely
to "escape tax liability."
5. The court erred in holding that the record in
this case supported the rrax Commission 'R decision, rejecting Kennecott's corporate tax return and instead requiring continued use of its Utah Copper Division operations as the basis for tax computation.

C. C. PARSONS,
WM. M. McCREA,
A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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BRIEF

I.
Point
This Court's conclusion that depletion may be computed
only on that part of Kennecott's net income from the
property allocated to Utah can find support in neither f~ct
nor law and contravenes the express T1.::rr'.dat~~ of the Le~is·
lature to the contrary by Chapter 13, T:i.tle 80, Utah Co(:e
Annotated 1943, especially its Sections 80-13-8 (9) (b) ~.nd
80-13-21.
No income at all is derived ftoJ11 this property until
the marketable product is sold. Smelting and refining
and transportation from smelter to refineries are activities, not of Kennecott, but of others hired by Kennecott for that purpose~ Like all other activities in this
single continuous ann elosel? integrated mining operation tl1eir ccst was paid by Kennecott, and with the
Commission's approval was deducted from the gross
income of Kennecott's Utah Copper Division whereby
to arrive at that Division's taxable net income. The cost
of those services included profit earned by and taxes
levied upon the independent custom smelters and refineries and the transcontinental carriers. Of course
those services added to the value of the ultima·te product
(without them there would have been no ultimate
product, no operation, and nothing for Utah to tax).
Wherein these and all others essential to this operation
contributed to the creation of a commercially marketable
product, Utah benefited by the increased net income
from the property which Utah was able to subje0t to its
State franchise tax.
3

This operation began with the removal of the crude
ores from the ground in Bingham Canyon, Utah, and
was not concluded until the production of the first commereially marketable product in the metals refined and
sold on the },tlantic coast; hence the allocation fraction.
Section 80-13-21. None of these aetivities in and of itself
yielded a profit. The only profit to taxpayer was tluJt
realized when the refined metals were sold. The metals
sold were from the property (certainly they were from
nowhere else) and their cash equivalent for which they
were sold was income from the same Ronrce. In the
nature of things there neither waR nor could there have
been any other source ·than the mining- property in Utah.
1\f either fabrication of the refined metalR nor their
uses for any purpose are here involved. The minim~ operation ceased Y.rith the production of the refined metals
and their sale. "\Ve are not here concerned with income
derived from fabrication or from any other operation
subsequent to that of mining, with which and only with
which we are here concerned. This Court correctly
defined the term "mining" as follows:

"Generally speaking, the phrase 'income
from the property' means the income from mining. 'The latter term is usually understood to
mean not merely the extraction of ores or minerals from the ground, but also the ordinary treatment processes normally applied by operators in
order to obtain the commercially marketable mineral product. ''
The several processes described in this Court's opmwn
were but incidents of this single, uninterrupted, closely
integrated mining 'operation. Without each and all of
4

them in their integrated aggregate, there would be no
income to tax. Of those operations some were within the
State of Utah, others outside, and the statutory allocation formula is for the purpose of assigning to the State
of Utah an equitable part of the total net income from
this mining property by this mining operation in its
entirety, on the basis of business done wi,~hin the State
of Utah as compared with that transacted outside.
Depletion must he computed on the ne•t income from
the property, hut when the Court states that Kennecott's
mining operation invv.ctcc; "fielcts not usually associated
with e::.!. ... ·on .,,,r\ ;,n 1c• ci' nt·c;;." it incli::att;s a lack of
understanding of the facts, which app~rcntly precludes
correct decision. Kennecott's operation is not only that
"usually associated with extraction and sale of ores;"
its field is that of all the great copper producers, from
the operations of which more than ninety percent of the
world's co;}per is obtained. The world is dependent
upon the low grade copper ores for its supply of copper
and of practical necessity, if mined at all, these low
grade ores must be removed from the ground on magnificent scale and handled in enormous quantity to produce
copper as the uHimate marketable product; otherwise the
operation would not be profitable.* The product at any
point prior to the refined metals of necef!sity must be on

"'Anaconda Copper Company
Anaconda Copper Company mills, smelts and refines all
of its production in Montana. Sales are by Anaconda
Sales Company, located in New York.
Kennecott Copper Corporation
Kennecott Copper Corporation mills all of its production

6

a scale beyond the financial ability of any smeHer to purchase and carry over the ninety day period required for
the smelting, transportation and refinement before a
commercially marketable product could be obtained.
It may he that this Court is laboring under the delusion that the franchise tax sbtute was enacted with
the basic thought that all "normal" mining operators
sold their crude ores or concentrates to the various
custom snelters within the State of Utah, at which point
their mininp; operations cease•l and that therefore Kenneeott's operation was not rnntc•mpl·cte(l by the Legis1atu re.

The franchi:-:;e tax statute was enacterl m 1931, at
and does ito, own smelting at the Nevada and Chin,, D-ivisions, where the mines of those Divisions, respectively,
are sitm.ted. At the Ray Division the smelting is done
in Arizona by the American Smelting and Refining Company under contract. At the Utah Division smelting is
done in Utah by the American Smelting and Refining
Company under contract. A small part1 of Chino production is fire-refined in New Mexico, 1but all the rest of
Kennecott's pmduction from all its Western properties
has been electrically refined under contmct by the American Smelting and Refining Ccmpany in states other than
those wherein the ores are extracted. All sales are by
Kennecott Sales Corporation in New York.

Phelps-Dodge Corporation
Phelps-Dodge Corporation mills, smelil:s and sells all its
copper production, the smelting generally being done in
Arizona, New Mexico and Mexico, the states where the
mines are located; but the refining is done on c-ontract
by Phelps-Dodge Refining Corporation at El P.aSio, Texas
and Laurel Hill, New York. Sales are by Phelphs-Dodge
Corporation with offices in New Y1ork.

6

which time the Utah Copper mine had been in operation
a full quarter of a century. The nature of that operation
in and out of the Sta:te of Utah over the whole of that
quarter century was accurately and fully comprehended
by the taxing authorities and the successive Legislatures
of this Sta,te. rrhe Legislature of 1931 enacted the franchise tax statute with its mine depletion deduction provisiom~

knovYinz full well tho oreration of Utah Copper

Cornpnny in and out of the State of Utah, the profitahle
chanwter of that oper·t:tion and the revenue lobe derived
by the State of Utah by applying thereto ,this franchise
tax statute with its al]oca,tion formula devised to meet
this Company's mining activities, initiated in the State
Inspiration Consolidated Copper Company
In the past the proclucciun from Ins;)iration Consolidated
Copper Company has been in part from leaching cperatio'!S, ai'd ~hat part is refined at the mine. The other portion of the production comes from concentrating ores.
These are ,smelted on contract by the International Smelting & Refining Company at Miami, Arizona, where the
mine is located, and 'On this part the refining is done by
International Smelting & Refining Company's refining
works in New Jersey. All of the sales are by Anaconda
Sales Company, located in New York.
Castle Dome
This company is a subsidiary .of Miami Copper Company.
The ores are milled 1at the mine near Miami, Arizona,
smelted on contraot at International Smelting & Refining
Company's smelter at Miami in part and part on contract
by Phelps-Dodge at Douglas, Arizlona. That part which
is smelted by InternaJtioJ11al is refined by the International
Smelting Company in the State of New Jersey, and that
part which is smelted by Phelps-Dodge is refined by
Phelps-Dodge Refining Corporation at El Paso, Texas.
Sales are by Adolph Lewisohn & Sons, located at New
York.
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of Utah, but concluded only on the Atlantic coast. In itt:
calculation of anticipated State revenue the Legislature
did not ov,~;:·look this, the greatest open pit copper mine
in the worM and the State's largest taxpayer.
Kennf\cott and its predecessor Utah Copper Company, with the other mining interests affected, were consulted and participated in the framing, amendment or
interpretation not only of the State franchise tax act,
but of the occupa.tion tax, net proceeds act, and other
statutes from time ·to time introduced for the purpose of
taxing the Inining industry. Also Kennecott and its
predecessor Utah Copper Company had been on the
tlefensive hefore the t:ning m'tho6ties of the State of
Utah an<1 the courts on review of the conduct of those
authorities too frequently to permit the conclusion that
the character of their operation tax-wise had escaped
the Legislature's notice. A mining operation is entered
upon to obtain a commercially marketable mineral prodMiami Copper Company
The ores are milled at the mine at Miami, Arizon:1, smelted
on contract at International Smelting & Refining Company's smelter, also at Miami, in part, and part by the
Phelps-Dodge at Doug-las, Arizona. That part which is
smelt~cl by International is refined hy the International
Smelting Company at its refinery in New Jersey, and that
part which is smelted by Phelps-D~1dge is refined by
Phelps-Dodge Rdining Corporat·ion at El Paso, Texas.
Sales ue by Adolph Lewisohn & Sons, located at New
York.
Consolidated Copper Mines
Ore is milled and smelted on contract in N evacla in which
state the mine is located, refined by American Metal Company at New Jersey, and sold by Consolidated Copper
Mines Company in New York.

8

uct. In this instance, for reasons well understood, such
a product could not have been obtained within the State
of Utah; of practical necessity it was obtainable and
obtained only at the conclusion of the operation on the
Atlantic coast, where and only where the entire net income from the property was or could have been realized .
.Moreover we have shown that there is nothing
unique or unn:mal in this mining operation of Kennecott
and ih; predecessor Utah Copper Company, having in
mind both its in-and-out-of-the-State-of-Utah aspect and
the copper product which it mines.
The Court proceeds:
'' • • • We believe that if the taxpayer claims
that all net income is not earned in this state, that
Magma Cc pl)er Company~Arizona
Ore io; lllilled and smelted by Magma Copper Company
in Ari:'.ona, refined ·on contract by Phelps-Dodge Refining
Corporation either at El Paso, Texas, or Long Island,
New York, and sold by the Magma Copper Sales Corporation located in New Y1ork
Calument & Hecla Consolidated Copper Company
The production from this company is smelted and refined
by this company in Michigan and is sold by the same
company in New York.
In 1941 the above accounted for 89o/o of the copper produced in the United States. The same pfiOceclures have been
followed since that time, but the relative production from these
properties has increased. All of the above information is from
American Bureau 'of Metal Statistics, a bureau which up until
the time of the war furnished the authoritative data on copper
pvoduced in the United States, and from the Minerals Year
Book, which is published by the Bureau of Mines, a department of the United States DepartmentJ of the Interior.
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the J;ortion alloeated to business done outside this state must, of necessity, not be, income
from the property within the meaning of Ol~r
statute. • " " if any net income is attributable to
business done elsewhere, it must come from operations which would not be considered ordinary
treatment processes normally applied by operators. The taxpayer in thi~ instnneo is in a rather
inconsistent posi,tion to assert that net income
pertaining to business perfonned outRide this
state can he considered aR net income from the
property. " " • All we need do in this case is to
point out ,that there are two noRsihle p~cths for the
taxpayer to take. " ·~ " f<jithe1· tl1e net income is
from the property and should lJe allorated to this
state, or the net incom:- is from hnth thp pronerty
and the postmininp; artivities and they are not so
related that the net in('ome f'annot he roughly
alloca:ted ,to both sources. " • "''
In the light of the fncts to which the Court's attention has now been directed, we think it will be understood
that the foregoing excerpt from the Court's opinion is
utterly unintelligible to us. H appears to us as a complete non sequitur.
The statute provides that:
''The portion of net income assignable to
business done within this state, and which shall
be the basis and a measure of the tax imposed
by this chapter, may be determined by an allocation upon the basis of the following rules: • • •"
§ 80-13-21.
How could it be that "if the taxpayer claims that all
net income is not earned in this State, that the portion
allocated to business done outside this State must, of

10

necessity, not be income from the property within the
meaning of our statute"~ Upon what premise are we
expected to arrive at that astonishing conclusion~ The
Court had already correctly defined the operation in and
out of the State of Utah as a single, uninterrupted mining operation. Indeed it is here so stipulated. Surely it
must be presumed to remain such until some interruptron shall have occurred more potent than the mere Intervention of a State line.
Vvhy are we to conclude that the refined metals are
not "from the property" merely because State lines
intel'venc in the processes necessary to the realization of
that first and the ultimate co1mnercially marketable mineral product sought? Of conrse, this Court would not
deny that the refined metals were from the property.
rrhose refined metals were income's equivalent; wherefore, would it not be reasonable to conclude that their
money equivalent was income likewise from the property~ By what inexplicable magic doe<s the intervention
of a State line break the continuity of this single, uninterrupted, closely integrated mining operation and
render no longe1· "from the property" the refined metals
mined from that source; or render their money equivalent, income no longer likewise from that property7
\Vhat the intervention of State lines t:ould have to do
with what was or was not income from the property
we cannot comprehend. Were this mining operation in
its integrated entirety ,to and including its first commercially marketable mineral product wholly within the
State of Utah, would this Court deduct from its total
net ineome, an estimated net income from transportation,
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refining and sales, and compute depletion only upon what
was left~ Of course it would not! Then why here emasculate that deduction for no other or better reason than
that transportation, some smelting, and all refining and
sa1eR were accomplished beyond the Utah State line?
The Court continues:

"If any net income is attributable to business done elsewhere, it must come from operations which would not be considered ordinary
treatment processes normally applied by operators.''
'l'o that statement the Cour·t aR fiCCn has nlrearl.y apnlied
its own (1enial. '!'hat statc·ment is a aen1al of the very
fact the Cour·t itself correctly has declD red, since the
operations here involved, and aU of them, were ia fact
the "ordinary treatment processes normally applied by
operators in order to obtain the commercially marketable
mineral product.'' Wherein were they not such~ Do they
cease to be such when State lines intervene, and if so,
why?
\:Vhy should the taxpayer ·be in this instance ''in a
rather inconsistent position to assert that net income
pertaining to business performed outside ·this state can
be considered as net income from the pro'P'erty'' ~ The
taxpayer has followed the plain and unequivocal wording of the statute, which sets up the ratio of business
done in the State to that transacted outside, as a basis
for allocation in and out of the State of the total net
income, including rentals, dividends and other income
as well as that derived from the property by the min-
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ing operation the Court has defined. None of these
operations are post-mining. They are, as the Court
properly defined them, a part of mining itself. Fabrication of the refined metals would be a post-mining activity, but fabrication 1s not here involved. Mining ceased
with the production and sale of the first and ultimate
commercially marketable mineral product, i.e., the refined metals. Such is the Court's own definition.
Then the Court further proceeded:
"All we need do in this case is to point ont
that there are two possible •paths for the taxpayer
to take ~, * '" Either the net income is from the
property and should be allocated to this state, or
the net income is from both the property and the
postmining activities and they are not so related
that the net income cannot be roughly allocated
to both sources.''

vVhy ma;· these plaintiffs not adhere to ithe position
which alwars has been theirs, that here they must comply with the statute which provides that:
''The portion of net income assignable to
business dJone within this state, and which shall
be the basis and measure of the tax imposed by
this chapter, may be determined by an allocation
upon the ba::;is of the following rules:" (~80-1321).
We suggest that the Court also remember that it is
here called upon to construe that same statute in the
light of the stipulated facts.
There being no market for Kennecott's ores, for
its concentrates or for its blister copper with milling,

13

';melting, refining and transportation being nothing more
than certain of the many necessary steps contributing
to the first and ultimate commercially marketable prodnet at the conclusion of the mining operation, the Cornmission in its computations always started, as of course
it nmst, with that first and ul1irnate commercinl prodnet,
whether for mine depletion, net proeee(h; or the occupation tax. Any attf•mpted allocation of income to an)'
of these preliminary activities, each and all of which
are necessary to a commercial product anti net income,
is eertninly not within the contemplation of the statute,
no more than does the statute contemplate a further
breakdown of net income as for labor, supplies or payment of Rocial Security taxes. 'ro what fantastic result
is this Court's legislative effort to bring us. The Court
is not construing the statute--there is none such.
There is nothing in this statute which seeks first to
break down a single, continuous, integrated mining operation into its several processes up to and including the
'p'roduetion and sale of the ultimate commercially marketable product; then to locate ~the intervening state lines;
and finally on the basis of their occurrence to eliminate
from the total ''net income from the property'' for purposes of depletion calculation, such excluded parts as in
the sovereign discretion of this defendant may accord
with its conception of what is equitable to Utah.
Seetion 80-13-8 (9) (b) provides:
''The allowance for depletion shall be thirtythree and one-third per cent of the ne:t income
from tl1e property."

14

·while the entire net income from Kennecott's Utah
Copper Division (except of course for minor rentals
and dividends a}ways excluded) is from its property in
Utah, that net income is in large part the result of business transacted outside the State of Utah. rrherefore,
Section 80-13-21, the statutory allocation formula, contemplates the very situation here involved and makes
provision for just that allocation returned by the plaintiffs.
This Court concludes that since the only property
subject to depletion is located in Utah, the depletion altowance should be computed on the net income allocated
to Utah. The defendant wants the money; but why the
Court so concludes is not disclosed. It is respectfully
submitted that the defendant and this Court attempt
to rewrite the statute.
Depletion is defined as a reduction in values by
destroying or consuming resources or values. Depreciation comprehends something which may be replaced,
but that which is lost through depletion is gone forever.
If assets are held for the purpose of earning revenue,
it is clea'r that any shrinkage in their value is a loss,
which should be charged against income before true
profit or net income can be ascertained. It is the unvarying practice, in the valuation of mining pro'perty, to
find the value of the minerals in the ground on the basis
of their sales price, the quantity of such minerals and
the deductions comprehending the total cost of operation,
including of .course the mining of the crude ores, milling,
smelting, refining·, transportation, marketing and all

15

other activities and processes essential to the ultimate
objective of a commercially marketable production. This
has always lx~en and can be the only basis upon which
the n1lue of mining 'Property may be determined. As the
mining propr•rty is the thing depleted, the basis for depletion must he the value of the property, determined as
stated. Such being the only accepted concept of depletion,
it is fallacious and unprecedented to assign any profit or
net income to any intermediate process or activit~', and
no sucl1 attempt would be made by any qualified appraiser. \~Vere the Utah Copper mine to he evaluated for
purpose of sale, such woulcl he the only basis which could
be used in arriving at the profit or loss sustained under
the franrhise tax statute. What is here actually going on
is that the ore body of the Utah Copper mine is being
sold from year to year, and the value of the part sold is
~the profit or net income resulting from the year's operation to and inelndinr; tl1e fir:-;t eommercially marketable
product and its sale. The resulting shrinkage in the
value of the ore body is de'pletion, which must he computed on the basis of ~total value and must first be deducted before net income can be realized.
In the li~~ht of the foregoing facts how can this
Court, without any precedent or authority whatever, in
the teeth of a statute which does not so provide, solemnly
declare its opinion that for purposes of the depletion
calculation, those activities or processes performed beyond the State line, although without question all necessary to the first marketable product resulting from the
total integrated operation, necessary to the very income
taxed, must have allocated to them either by some in16

e~,l1licnl)k'

inennin.tion, or hy an m·hitrary stat('-line
division, a part of that total net income in computing
the allowance for depletion! It is res'P'ectfully submitted
that it is the plain intent of the law that the taxpayer
shall have the value of his mining property as of the
basic date, income tax free. Actually no mining operator
realizes a profit or any net income until the operation
shall have discharged its ·burden of returning to the
participants in the venture the capital invested. 'rhe
Utah Si:ate l<'ranchise Tax Act did not become effecti\'e
until .January 1, 1931, and any appreciation in the value
of tlw E1inernl (l;':;o:·.it 1wfore tkct date ennno~ be su1Jject
to tax as income. The plain intent of legis·lative enactments, whether Federal or State, is that there shall be
allowed compensations for Joss through exhaustion of the
mineral property, and the amount of depletion allowable
will obviously he 'prnporJionD.te to the exhaustion suffered. De~Ietion suffered in any year is the money value
in the ground of that part of the ore body removed by
production; and its money value in the ground is its
sales price, less all costs up to the first commercially
mnrketahle produd, such marking the termination of the
mining operation.
The Legislature recognized the faet that the mine
at Bingham is a wasting asset and deen'ed that the
depletion allowance should he computed on the "net
income from the prope1'ty." Thus using Kennecott's
1ire.t mar\zetable product as the base, was this statute
construed and applied by the defendant from its passage
until March 10, 1945, the date of defendant's proposed
adjustments. 'J.1he allowance for depletion is not part
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of the allocation formula-it is a deduction just as are
the costs of the mining operation, a deduction which by
Seetion 80-13-21 is to be made before an allocation fraction can be applied. It is not intended to make, and the
statute cannot be rightly construed as making, the depletion allowance dependent on or subject to an aUoeation of net income to tne State of Utah. The propriety
of a depletion allowance is not to be ruled hy the fortuitous occurrence of state boundaries. The one bears no
relation to the other. By the statute itself the depletion deduction must be mo.de nn0n total. net income
befoce depletion, not npnn a par< of it, and the depletion
deduction must of necessit:v nroc:ede allocation of net
income b• Utah.
In the absence of other authority, the intent of the
Legislature eX"pressed in the Utah Net Proceeds Tax
Statute, Section 80-5-56, Utah Code Annotated 194;), as
amended, Session Laws 1947, c. 106, Section 1, page 398,
and the Utah Mine Occupation rrax Statute, Section 805-66, as amended, should be especially significant.
By Sections 80-5-56, 57, of the Net Proceeds Tax
Statute, as amended, it is provided that:
'' 80-5-56. Asse~sment of ]\fines.
''All metalliferous mines and mining C'laims,
both placer and rock in place, shall he assessed
• * * at a value equal to 'two times the average
net annual proceeds thereof for the three calendar
years next preceding or for as many years or
fractions thereof next preceding as the mine has
been operating, whichever is less.* * *
"80-5-57. Id. Net Annual Proceeds-Definition
of-Basis for Tax-Deductions.
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"The words, 'net annual proceeds,' of a
metalliferous mine m mining claim are defined
to he the gross proceeds realized. during the preceding calendar year from the sale or conversion
into money or its equivalent of all ores from such
mine or mining claim * • *The foUowing, and no
other, deductions may be taken:
"(5) The actual cost not exceeding a reasonable cost of ·the transportation of the ore from
the mine to the market or reduction works.
" ( 6) The charge made for sampling, assaying, rcducting (sic) and smelting the ore and
extracting the metals and minerals therefrom;
* * * ''

By Section 80-fJ-66, as amended, of the Mine Occupation Ta.x Statute, it is provided that:
'' • • • every person engaged in the business
of mining or producing ore containing gold,
silver, copper, ·lead, iron, zinc or other valuable
metal in this state shall pay to the state of Utah
an occupation tax equal to one per cent of the
gross amount received for or the gross value of
metalliferous ore sold • • *
'' (c) If a mill or other reduction works is
opera ted exclusively in connection with a mine,
such mill or reduction works shall be treated as
a part of the mine and the cost of operating such
mill or reduction works shall, for the purpose
of fixing the occupation tax imposed by this act,
be regarded as part of the cost of mining and cost
of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, and
transportation, only, shall he deducted..''
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The net proceeds tax is an ad valorem property
tax levied upon mines and mining claims evaluated by
applying a multiple to the average net proceeds from
the propei'ty over a. period of years preceding the tax.
Under that statute the miner must report his total net
proceeds from the property after deductions for "milling, smelting, refining, marketing, transporting,'' etc.
No court or commission has yet attempted to break down
such net proceeds at points where state boundaries
may intercept the path of "the ordinary treatment
processes normally applied by operators in order to ohtain th~ commercially marketable mineral product,"
in order to assess the mine 'On the ba::;is of that part of
the total net proceeds from the property allocated to
Utah. But depletion is a reduction in values by destroying or consuming resources or values. Just as this ad
valorem property tax deals with total value, so, of necessity, must depletion he computed on total value. For
purposes of depletion the taxpayer must have the value
of his property as of the basie date, tax free. And, of
course, it can make not the slightest difference in fact
or principle where state lines shall cross the mining processes. No more did the Legislature when enacting the
State Franchise Tax Statute intend by the term "net
income from the property" only that par't of the net
income from the property which the Commission ''in its
discretion" shall have allocated to Utah.
Section 80-5-66 of the .Mine Occupation Tax Statute
provides that the miner- shall pay an occupation tax
equal to one per cent of the gross amount received for
metalliferous ores sold. And it is further provided that
20

if a mill or other reduction works shall be operated exelusively in connection with a mine, such mill or reduction works shall be treated as a part of the mine and the
cost of uperating such mill or reduction works shall be regarded as part of the cost of mining, and in addition
the cost of assaying, sampling, smelting, refining, and
transportation shall be deducted. Again it makes not
a particle of difference where state lines cross the mining processes.
Does the Conrt appreciate the fact that a "refinery"
-fire or elcctrolyt ic-is to copper the same type of a
"reduction works" that for example a cyanide plant is to
gold? Each is eqnally necessary to create or effect the
first normally eommercinJ marketable product.
True, by allocating income from the sales of gold to
the mint on some ratio of costs, or by the injection of a
basically unrelated "state 1ine" theory, one could declare
by fiat that X Dollars was the value of the ore before
the eyanide or any other intermediate process in ,the
mining production chain short of the ultimate produet.
But that deelaration ipsa dixit cannot create something
that in fact does not exist; nor could the Legislature
have had such in mind when it enacted these statutes.
'rhe income from each mine expressed in dollars is still
the value or sales price received for the mine's first
normally commercial marketable product in fact, not in
theory.

It is submitted, with all respect due this Court, that
the portion of its opinion here discussed is inconsistent
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with itself and unintelligi,ble; that it is constructed upon
assump6ons contrary to fact and in the teeth of the
stipulruted record herein; that the Court has ignored,
cir by implica:tion has rewritten the statute, not construed
it; and in so doing has tendered into an already complicated problem an incoherent discussion which bears
no logical relation to the conclusion announced.

II.

Point
This Court has violated basic and elementary principles
of statutory construction by concluding that depletion may
be computed only on that part of Kennecott's net income
from the property assigned to Utah.

a. A cardinal rule of statutory construction is that
where legislation is adpoted from another jurisdiction,
the interpretations and meaning which have been given
that wording by the sister jurisdiction are likewise
adopted as a part of the statute.
This rule has been generally followed in this state:
In re Oowan, 98 U. 393, 99 P. 2d 605; Norville v. State
Tax Commission, 98 U. 170, 97 P. 2d 937, 126 A.L.R.
1318; Fuller-Toponce Trud-e Co. v. Public Service Commission~, 99 U. 28, 96 P. 2d 722; and In re Ra1eigh, 48 U.
128, 158 P. 705 wherein the rule is stated thus:
''In view ~that the decisions of Iowa were in
effect before that section was adopted by the code
commission of this state in 1898, we must assume
that the construchon placed upon ~t by the Supreme Court of Iowa was likewise adopted.''
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By the record herein it was stipulated (R. 106) that
the Federal law was the model for the Utah income tax
law; and th~~!h re_~ to the base for the pere~p~~
depletion deduction, the language is identic~l. In each
__.::;.----~----case that base is '' ine_ome from the property.:' This has
been construed to mean in the ease of this same and similar mining operations, the income obtained through the
norma:! milling and reduction processes necessary in
addition to extraction to obtain the commercially marketable product of refined copper. (R. 67)

----

--

Since this does not appear to have been made too
clear to the Court, we quote from the undisputed ,testimony of expert witness <H~ORGE C. EARL (R. 67-9):

'' Q Has the Federal Government ever attempted
in its administration of its law to makE} such
an allocation as the Commission's Staff now
'proposes?
"A Insofar as the operations of Kennecott in
Utah, or the Utah Copper before it became
Kennecott's property was eoncerned, n10
s11ch allocation has ever been attempted. They
have, however, in recent years a 1ttempted to
allocate profits from certain oper'ations 'Of
some of the other units of Kennecott, where
these further processes were carried on by
Kennecott. It has never attempted to allocate
any profits to any of the properties of Kennecott where the processes or transportation
has been hy others. It has announced no
intention of ever doing such a thing. We have
had some controversy with them as to the
allocati'On of profits to smelting wt Nevada
and in New Mexico where the Internal Reve-
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nue Department has attempted to allocate
a part of,-a very small part I may sayof the profit to the smelting of the concentrates in Kennecott's srm~lters. The basis
for this attempt by the Government as announced by them is because Kennecott, at
'those particular smelters, smelts other
people's ores, that is they engaged in a custom smelting business, and do, of course,
make a profit on that smelting, or attempt
to make a profit at least on the smelting of
the custom ores, and because of that the Federal Government has attempted to allocate
a very small portion of the profit to the
smelting in those two instances.

"Q But as I gather, not in the cases of the Utah
operations because it is the company's contention that whatever profit there results
from this postmilling operations is paid to
the parties who do that world
"A Of course, that is the basis underlying it, hut
the Federal Government had never attempted
to allocate anything. They say 'On their de,termina:tions, 'These services performed by
others at cost to Kennecott' and they have
made no attempt whatever to allocate any
profit. I might state in connection with this
that things that have developed in that connection, that much of this need of allocating
profits so far as the T~~ederal Government
is eon(~erned, has arisen from the fact that in
man~· instances, in fact several cases in Utah,
it is done where a Mining Company charged
itself a cost of smelting, or made a cost for
smelting whi(·h wasn't the eost, for instance,
if one of HH~ smelting eompanies in Utah
would smelt a certain grade of ore for an24

other mining company for $7.00 a ton without
charging themselves $7.00 a ton, and as a result the smelting operation was making rthe
profit at the expense of the mining O'P'erati on. And it was announced in many instances, and it appears in the Congressional
Record in statements made by the under~(~eretn rics of the 'rreusury, particularly },! r.
Paul, that the purpose of ailoca ting any costs
whatsoever to processes was to make the company owning a smelter, or other processing
plant,-put them on the same basis as any
other taxpayer ·who didn't own those things,
and that the Department didn't ever intend to
allocate profits on any other conditions.

"Q T11en, Mr. Earl, it is your opinion that by the
same reason there is no occasion whatsoever
for fhis attempt hy the Commission's Staff to
moJ.:e an allocation in this instance~
''A That is correct.''
So it would hardly seem reasonable that Utah's
legislature had any different concerpt in mind when it
provided that depletion might be a percentage of the
same net income from the same mine. That is, the same
refined copper less the same expenses; as likewise was
the base under the occupation and net proceeds ~taxes,
supra.
VVe submit that to hold to the contrary would be in
violation 'Of this fundamental and elementary rule ·of
statutory construction.
'l'he seeond basic rule of statutory construction
which the present opinion violates is that of administrab.
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tive or contemporaneous construction. It was here stipulated that from 19:n when the law was first enacted until
1942, ~the 'Cax Oommission in applying the statute to this
and ail other taxpayers construed the intent of Utah's
legislature to he that adopted hy the E'ederal Government (which the Commission likewise invoked for both
the occupation and net proceeds mining tax laws). That
is, taxpayer's refined copper as the first commercially
marketable product was taken a.s the tax base, from
which was then deducted the expenses of the necessary
and normal extraction, treatment and reduction processes and the deduction for depletion. The proceeds from
the sales of the copper before any fabrication constituted
the "income from the property." (R. 106-8).
Each of the elements appropriate to place this rule
of administrative construction into operation is in this
instance present. \:Ve quote from 2 Sutherland on Statutory Construc1tion ( 3rd :B~d.) Sec. 5104:
'' rrhe conclusiveness of a contemporaneous
and practical construction will depend upon a
number of additional elements that give efficacy
to the rule. In general, these elements are: (1)
that the interpretation originated from a reliable
source; (2) that the interpretation has continued
for a long period of time and received wide acceptance; and (3) that the interpreta,tion was
made at or n~ar the time of the enactment of the
statute.''
In this respect the situation is far different from
the deduction-of-income-taxes interpretation orginaily
a par't of this case, and determined by this Court in the
New Park Mining Company decision, 196 P. 2d 485.
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Thus the opmwn as it now stands is in the teeth
of this basic rule, to a degree ,that amounts to a violation of the elementary principle that it is not the province
of the Cour't to legislate.

III.
Point
The Court erred in its decision relative to the depletion
deduction wherein it held that Kennecott's request to c>hange
the method of computation was "unduly delay,ed," a holding contrary to fact and not raised by the Commission.

True, Kennecott once had "its option to select the
mPt'}wd it desir''d til use" ( CI!inion p. (j). The Court tfJen
admits that ''a change in the administrative regulations
might be good grounds for requesting a change in accounting practice." There is no dispute that important
administrative changes here were made.

a. But how, in this case, was KennecoH's request
"unduly delayed"'? It was made before and during the
only formal hearing hefore the Commission, which made
the record for this Court.
The Commission did not object that the request was
not timely. It stipulated in this Court by the time of oral
argument that Kennecott would he permitted to switch
to the cost-or-value method. Then it joined in our request
for an interpretation of the question of whether or not
it might invoke the federal percentage or some other
alternative method instead of the two specifically described in the law.
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This Court was the first to suggest any "undue"
delay. vVhat standard is now to guide Kennecott, or any
other taxpayer? Does the Court really mean that we
can't request a change of m'ethod, because we didn't
anticipate that the Commission would make at least three
changes in administmtive regulations; and so anticipating file our request in this case two years before that
fact occurred 'I Of course no taxpayer cnn sustain that
burden of prophecy if that he the test of a timely reCfLWst.

vVe can add but little to the dissent: "The rejection
by the Commission of its previous stand in the matter
should throw the door open to the company making a
selection as contemplated by the section of the code involved.''
We have thought it fundamental that one who
changes the rules of any game in the course of its conduct without allowing the others to ad.fust their positions
a,ccord,inJgly, might be characterized by an unpleasant
word. Th'e Commission realizing this by the time of the
hearing before this Court and when the record in this
Oourt had been au,gmented to show its repndiation of former :principles, cooperated fully by asking for an interpretation by this Court of the methods or courses
of action open, including a switch to cost depleti'on which
it professed to this Oourt would be allowed.
Yet the majority opinion seems to hold Kennecott to
the position taken by it in reliance on the Commission's
previous actions; and uses as an excuse something never
raised by 'the Commission-that Kennecott's requests
in both instances were ''unduly delayed.''
2f

IV.
Point.
The Court erred in holding that Kennecott's request
for permission to change the method of depletion computation was for no "substantial" reason, but merely to "escape
tax liability".
Kennecott's reasons for requesting the change in
method for computing depletion are in no way associated with ''repeated requests to change systems merely
for the purpose of escaping tax liability". (Opinion p.
7.) It was the only such request since the law was first
enacted in 19;!1.
Kennecott felt and still feels ~that it is being denied
the "reasonable allowance for depletion" which Utah's
statute grants to all taxpayers alike. We quote from
Section 80-1:3-8 ( 8) which establishes as a deduction:
'' • • • a reasonable allowance for depletion
and for depreciation of improvements, according
to the peculiar conditions in each case."
We submit that the denial of such aUowanee by
commission or court is indeed a "substantial" cause
of complaint, even ~though the incidental result is a
lower tax and to that extent an ''escape of tax liability''.
Since the Oourt has either overlooked, or by ignoring has not found persuasive the basis for Kennecott's
claim 'that it has been denied that ''reasonable allowance", these reasons are reiterated briefly as follows:
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a. Utah's corporation franchise tax is a tax on net
income. It is not a tax on returns of capital.
b. Therefore not only are applicable expenses first
deducted to obtain the taxable net income base, but also
depreciation and mine depletion. Depletion is peculiar
to wasting assets involving returns of capital.

c. To determine mine depletion, a choice between
two general methods is originally available to the ~tax
payer:
( 1) Straight-line depletion of the cost-or-value of
the pro'perty at the time the tax law became effective
-just as in the case of depreciation.
(2) A percentage of either the "gross" under
federal law, or "net" under the Utah law, "income from
the property".

d. The taxpayer Is afforded an initial election
between these methods. Thereafter a switch may not he
made without the consent of the Tax Commission. This
is not an arbitrary power ves'ted in the Commission,
hut a control to be used according to the circumstances
of each particular case to prev·ent unfair results to either
the State or the taxpayer.
Since 1916 the Federal Government, and from
1931 until this case, the Tax Commission alike, construed "income from the property" to be the value of
the first commercially marketable product obtained from
the mine. In the case of porphyry copper mines such as
the Utah Copper Mine with its extreme'ly low ore con-

e.
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tent, this first commercially marketable product is refined copper. Some of the smelting, and the equally
essential refining processes ha:ve taken place outside of
the State of Utah. No fabrication is here involved, we
again repeat.

f. Utah's Tax Commission from 1931 through 1941
also construed the ne~t income from Kennecott's property
on which depletion was computed to be net income before
deduction of federal taxes.
_q. Helying upon interpretations e and f above, the
owner of the Utah Copper .Mine in 1931 originally elected
the rwrcentage depletion method. In 1936, when the
property was acquired by Kennecott, the taxpayer by
agTeement with the Commission filed its tax returns
invoking a method of separate accounting for the Utah
Copper l\fine, likewise in reliance upon the administrative interpretations outlined above.

h. In 1945 (although for the 1942 tax return) 1the
Tax Commission made several changes in its rulings
including two chang·es specifically with respect to points
e and f:
(1)

It determined that "income from th'e property"

now was meant by the legislature to mean either the
:value of the ore at the mine, or at most the :value 'Of the
conc'entrates at the mill. Since there was no commercial
market for either, it invented a self-proving formula
applied to Kennecott alone to establish or create such
a :value mathematically.
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(2) Also it said that mines using the percentage
depletion method now must first deduct the federal,taxes.
These taxes often reached the 90% bracket since the
United States was financing World War II.
J,.
Kennecott pointed out (Exhibit 4) that the
mathematical result was to cut down to less than onehnlf, the depletion allowance which would be available
under either of the two federal methods; or under the
Utah co::-;t-or-value of 1931 method; or under the Uta:h
'percent-age method nntil the injection of the distorted
frrlernl taxes and the ehanp;cs in administrative rulings.
It shonU again he recalled that the taxpayer nndcr its
10;l1 ehnice had elected to use the per,centage rather
than the cost-or-value method in reliance upon the Tax
Commission's interpreta1tions which now were to be
changed.

j. By timely request-before and at the hearing
which was sought to be reviewed in this Court-Kennecott accordingly asked:
(l) To be allowed to "re-elect" 'the method for
determining depletion; i.·e., to use either the Utah costor-value method, or th'e federal percentage-of-gross
method.

(2) To file a return on the basis of its over-all
operations. (We need not set forth here the treatment
afforded this second request, since it is hereinafter
covered as the final reason urged for granting a rehearing of this cause.)
1

k.

As 'to changing the method of computing the
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depletion deduction, the Tax Commission by its brief
and stipulation herein finally conceded the point. It said
that the taxpayer would be granted permission to switch
to the cost-or-value method. It also cooperated by joining
Kennecott in asking the Court to determine whether or
not the federal percentage-of-gross method was available under the wording and intent of Utah's statutes.
l. As to the latter, this Court said in effect "Perhaps-we need not decide". And as to the former, af'ter
fifteen months it hranded Kennecott's request--finally
concc(!ul b:i lhe Commission-as untimely!

Next the Conrt proceeded to rejeot the federal
interr!retation as to what vVaR "income from the propertY'' hecause '' ariRing under different statutory provisions". But the wording is identical; it is stipulated
that it was the model for Utah's law; and therefore by
a basic rule of statutory construction the feder:al interpretations at the time Utah's legislature adopted th'e
wording were to be followed.
Jl!.

n. No mention was made by the Court of the 'Pax
Commission's own similar administrative interpretations
of this wording for eleven years until this case.

o. And finally, the Court rewrote the statute to
say in effect that percentage depletion under Section
80-1B-8 should be based not only upon net income "from
the property", but should be further limited to net income ''from the property assignable to Utah under
Section 80-13-21".
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Thus apparently the majority concluded that here
the depletion allowance was reasonable. Therefore of
course it would follow that the Commission could not
he arbitrary in denying use of any other method of
computation.
nut in order 80 to hold the allowance reasonable,
the Court had first to lay down a new set of rules to
determine depletion for a mine with multi,ple state processes neressary before the first commercially marketable mineral product is obtained. The fallacy of this
diseriminatory ruling has heretofore been made apparent. 'I'his Court erred in not requiring the allowance of
the reasonable deduction in accordance with the mandate
of Utah's legislature.

v.
Point.
The Court erred in holding that the record in this case
supported the Tax Commission's decision, rejecting Eennecott's corporate tax return and inst~ad requiring continued use of its Utah Copp,er Division operations as the
basis for tax computation.
The majority opinion assumes facts and possibilities
for which no basis exists in the record before the court.
For example is the next-to-last sentence of the
opinion on page 3-"Had the request been granted at
that late date it would have resulted in a substantial
c:hange in accounting procedure and would have com-
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plicated and not simplified what was already a difficult
tax question". Again, in the next-to-last paragraph on
page 4: "We • • • see many pradical difficulties had a
different method been permitted. • • * To use the method
set out in the first subparagraphs of the section might
introduce variable facts, some impossible of ascertainment, Rnch as the relative value of mines or mining
property. The determination of this factor alone might
lead to endless and unsatisfactory litigation. In addition it might unjustly discriminate against this state
or the taxpayer in that the tax assessed might bear no
n~m;ondJle relationship to the value of the ore extracted
or the mnount of business done in this state." (Italics
ours.)
\Ve thought this was a judicial proceeding in the
nature of a review of the record below-not an occasion
for the expression of what "may" or "might" or might
not be. And we thought Utah statutes as interpreted
hy the Califomia Paeking Company (97 u. i3G7, ~~3 P. 2d
46:)) ea:-:e were (•lear and unamhiguons, the decision to
depend UJ!On the record in the particular case.

Here the record is silent, except that in January,
1948 (long before the hearing before the Commission
and its decision in 1949 on which this review is based)
Kennecott prepared and filed an amended return on the
corpora:te basis as requirecl by stat,nte. It stated that the
reason for the change was the Commission's repudiation
of principles which originally caused the taxpayer to use
the separate accounting method of return with the
consent of the Commission. (R. 228-234.) The Com-
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mission itself didn't find anything wrong with this
amenderl return-even as to the "rlifficulties" which
the majority opinion thinks "might" be there. It simply
ignored the amended return to the extent that it was
omitted from the record certified by it to this Court,
until Kennecott filed a motion to augment. Then at lasrt
it sent the amended return to this Court.
·what guide is now to be followed in such cases by
Kennecntt or any other taxpayed Is the Commission's
{lX parte fiat that the formula does not work in a particular case absolute, a hearing and record being unnecessary~ It is possible that given a hearing, and if it
were incumbent upon it so to do, Kennecott could demonstrate that t'he corporate method the better effected
an allocation of earnings; and rthe Commission might so
hold. \Ve had thought it clear under the California Packing case (97 U. 367, 93 P. 2d 463) that there must be a
hearing with the burden of proof on the Commission.
As a matter of fact, H1e suggestion for an amended
return filed on the corporate basis originally came in
mirl-Hl47 from the Commission's own staff. (R. 0:1-6.)
At that time the Staff took fue posi~tion that under Utah's
statutes, an interstate taxpayer had to file on the corporate hasis, unless by agTeement or by assuming its
burden of proof under subsection 8, the Commission
otherwise determined. We agree thart this still plainly
states the law. But presumably when it was discovered
that the resulting tax computations were in Kennecott's
favor, the Staff forthwith abandoned all such talk and
proceeded simply to ignore Kennecott's amended return
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prepared on that basis. One wonders, had the Staff
persisted because fhe tax results were in the State's
favor, if such action on review would be held by this
court to be "untimely"; and void because of a major
change in accounting; and in the absence of any record,
fraught with possible "difficulties".
And as to these "difficulties" which the Court
anticipates here, we cannot forget :Mr. Christopherson's
statrment in the Staff conferences to the effect that
"there would be no great administrative difficulties"
should filing· on t11e corporate basis be required. Any
taxpayer with corporate property within and without
the state, or with employees within or without the state,
mn~d. .;ustaiJJ i :~; n:~tnms, nnd lliffieulties "mny" be
<'neountered by it or the State Tax Commission.
Thus Kennecott wHh no great difficulty prepared
aml filed its amended return .January 19, 1948. The
formal hearing was held in December of that year. It
is this amended return flled more than a year before
the Commission's decision .J annary 22, 1949 which, if
the majority opinion stands, was now "untimely".
To conclude on this point, frankly we are shocked
that members of this Court, with no definitive determination by the Commission, without a record on which
its decision should be based, and without an opportunity
to the taxpayer to be heard, should deny the opportunity
to proceed in accordance with what is the plain mandate
of the legislature. The taxpayer rmtst file, invoking the
formula of Section 80-13-21, until the Commission should
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determine following a hearing that a return on the corporate basis "does not" make a proper assignm~nt of
income to the State of Utah. And the Commission's
determination must find appropriate support in the
record upon review.

Conclusion.

Following oral argument herein where substantially
the same time was given this "difficult" case as in
actions involving a simple appeal, the then Chairman
of 11H~ T:1x Commission shared the opinion of plaintiffs'
counsel-that this court simply didn't understand the
ramitlcations l1erein involved. Recognizing fully our own
shortcomings responsible for this situation, we tried in
vain to suggest re-argument when a year elapsed without action by the Court. Now the opinion finally produeed confirms our worst fears.
\Ve ·would think that the Commission itself would
ask for further clarification. 'l'his, since the mixing
together of the depletion allowance with assignment of
income to state lines not only is contrary to the Commission's interpretations through 1941, including its
settlement of Case No. 6324 herein, but is about to
plunge us into further confusion and conflict. For if
by mathematical say-so something not a fact is held to
be so for depletion purposes, namely, a commercial
market value for Kennecott's mill eoncentrates, it beeomes such for occupation and net proceeds tax purposes; and the arbitrary state line cut-off rather than
38

the first commercially marketable product in fact-copper at the refineries-will be the tax base ·with Kennecott entitled to substantial refunds due to these changes
in rn]ings. That is, unless this court will also rewrite
the occupation and net proceeds tax laws.
Kennecott respectfully requests that to prevent injustice and further conflict and confusion, this Court
should grant a rehearing. It should take the time necessary to become truly informed on the issues herein so
that it may remand the case with the following instructions:
a. r~'hat the Utah legislature, using the words "income from the property" concerning the mine depletion
deduction, intPnrled to require use of the market price
or value of the mine operator's first normally commercial marketable products. (Just as Congress intended, the Utah legislatnre intended with respect to
the mine occupation and net proceeds taxes, and as
the '!'ax Commission interpreted the law for eleven
years.)
b. That in v1ew of the Tax Commission's change
of administrative rulings, this taxpayer should he afforded the opportunity to re-file, selecting anew from
the alternatives originally available. That this amended
return be subject to determination by the Tax Commission to the extent necessary to invoke the legislative
mandates that the depletion allowance he "fair and
reasonable" under the circumstances of this case, and
that the assignment of mcome fairly reflects to Utah
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''the 'portion of net income rea.sona;bly attributable to
business done in this state''; both such determinations
to be subject to the usual procedures for redetermination
and review.

Respectfully submitted,

C. C. PARSONS,
WM. M. McCREA,

A. D. MOFFAT,
CALVIN A. BEHLE,
Attorneys for Plaintiffs.
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